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Abstract
Ali (Ethics and Information Technology 17:267–274, 2015) and McCormick (Ethics and Information Technology 3:277–
287, 2001) claim that virtual murders are objectionable when they show inappropriate engagement with the game or bad 
sportsmanship. McCormick argues that such virtual murders cannot be wrong on Kantian grounds because virtual murders 
only violate indirect moral duties, and bad sportsmanship is shown across competitive sports in the same way. To condemn 
virtual murder on grounds of bad sportsmanship, we would need to also condemn other competitive games. I argue, contra 
McCormick, that virtual murders performed within massively multiplayer online roleplaying games can be wrong on Kantian 
grounds when they are exploitative. Exploitation occurs when virtual murder treats the player controlling the victim in a way 
that they have no opportunity to consent to (i.e. as a mere means in Kantian terminology). I argue that some virtual murders 
involving inappropriate engagement (Ali, Ethics and Information Technology 17:267–274, 2015) and bad sportsmanship 
(McCormick, Ethics and Information Technology 3:277–287, 2001) are exploitative in this way and therefore also wrong 
on Kantian grounds.
Keywords Virtual murder · MMORPGs · Kantian Deontology · Exploitation
Introduction
When we talk about virtual murder, we are typically refer-
ring to the sort of act which Morgan Luck defines as follows:
A player commits an act of virtual murder in those 
cases where he directs his character to kill another in 
circumstances such that, were the game environment 
actual, the actions of his character would constitute 
actual murder (Luck 2009, p. 31).
There are two ways to unpack this definition: in terms 
of the constitution of murder and in terms of the game 
environment.
In terms of constitution, Luck’s definition suggests that, 
for any act of virtual murder, there can be a possible real-
world counterpart. This allows us to say two things. Firstly, 
‘virtual murder’ is an umbrella term that accommodates a 
variety of virtual acts, such as assassination, homicide, and 
genocide. Secondly, just as every act of actual killing is not 
an act of actual murder, there will be acts of virtual killing 
that are not virtual murders. For example, virtual killings 
that arise from just war, self-defence, or accident would not 
constitute a virtual murder.
What virtual murder entails depends on whether the 
virtual murder takes place in a single player or multiplayer 
game environment. In single player games, a player can only 
commit virtual murder if they direct their character to kill 
a non-playable character or a computer-generated charac-
ter. Examples include purposefully running over a pedes-
trian in Grand Theft Auto or ‘accidentally’ setting fire to 
a sim in The Sims. In multiplayer games, a player can also 
commit virtual murder by directing their character to kill 
another player’s character. An example would be killing 
another player’s character’s in World of Warcraft to steal 
that character’s possessions. Whilst virtual murders per-
formed in multiplayer games can be directed against both 
computer-generated characters or other players’ characters, 
I will examine the latter case in this article.
Although interesting moral arguments can be made about 
virtual murder in either game context, I will focus on vir-
tual murders performed in multiplayer games, specifically 
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on those enacted in massively multiplayer online roleplaying 
games (hereafter MMORPGs) such as World of Warcraft 
and Second Life. Such games feature real players interact-
ing with other real players through the medium of virtual 
avatars and virtual actions. It is this dichotomy between the 
real and the virtual that raises the question of whether an 
entirely virtual act—virtually murdering another player’s 
avatar—constitutes a real moral wrong.
For those who support the so-called magic circle argu-
ments, the answer to this question is a definitive ‘no’. In 
Homo Ludens, Huizinga (1949) argued that games are 
demarcated from real-life in the sense that gameplay takes 
place within a ‘magic circle’. Inside this magic circle, the 
game environment has its own rules and norms which tem-
porarily replace those of the real-world. For example, when 
playing rugby, it is permissible to tackle another player to 
the ground. As long as one is playing the game, this norm 
(tackling is acceptable) supersedes real-life rules (whereby 
‘tackling’ would constitute physical assault). Numerous the-
orists have applied Huizinga’s magic circle to video games 
in order to determine whether virtual game actions can be 
assessed in relation to real-world moral codes (Craft 2007; 
Kim and Werbach 2016; Ostritsch 2017). Those who support 
the magic circle argument argue for a form of amoralism, 
whereby virtual actions take place within the magic circle 
and are thus performed in a space which is separate to the 
real-world and exempt from real-world moral judgements.1 
On this view, no act of virtual murder is wrong because no 
virtual actions (within games) can be morally evaluated.
The remainder of this article argues against the magic cir-
cle views by arguing that some virtual murders in MMOR-
PGs are morally wrong, on Kantian grounds. I argue for 
this position in four sections. Firstly, I discuss the features 
of MMORPGs—being massively multiplayer, being online, 
involving roleplay, and being games—in order to explain 
why MMORPGs are morally evaluable. Secondly, I con-
sider arguments by Ali (2015) and McCormick (2001) 
which support the idea that some cases of virtual murder are 
objectionable, but not necessarily morally wrong. Thirdly, I 
expand on these arguments to argue that some virtual mur-
ders in MMORPGs are wrong, on Kantian grounds, when 
they involve exploitation. Exploitation will occur when the 
virtual murder treats the player controlling the victim in a 
way that they have no opportunity to consent to. I explain 
how this exploitation is shown in both cases of inappro-
priate engagement (Ali 2015)2 and bad sportsmanship 
(McCormick 2001). Finally, “The social roles objection” 
section defends this view against the social roles objection, 
which states that victims do tacitly consent to the virtual 
murder. This challenges my claim that the act of virtual 
murder treats victim players as mere means by involving 
an exploitative lack of consent. I argue that the social roles 
objection is unsuccessful.
The moral status of MMORPGs
MMORPGs have four main features: they are massively 
multiplayer, they are online, they involve roleplay, and they 
are games.3 This section discusses how each of these fea-
tures makes MMORPGs morally evaluable.
Massively multiplayer
“To the extent that our game play puts us in contact 
with agents who are either rational or sentient, it is the 
proper subject of moral evaluation” (Patridge 2011, 
p. 303).
In the above quotation, Stephanie Patridge pinpoints the 
very simple reason why the ‘massively multiplayer’ element 
of MMORPGs makes them morally evaluable; other people 
are involved in the game. When we use our avatars to inter-
act with other avatars in a MMORPG, we are typically inter-
acting with other real people—the other gamers controlling 
the avatars. As we generally accept that other real people are 
moral agents, it seems feasible to suppose that our virtual 
interactions with other real people are, at least in principle, 
morally evaluable.
Yet, if the ‘magic circle’ arguments of the introduction 
are correct, Patridge’s claim is false. On the magic circle 
view, all agents involved in game play are within the magic 
circle, and beyond moral evaluation. In other words, the 
presence of other people does not automatically make a 
game morally evaluable. This is because the other people 
are game players and actions performed towards these other 
game players are game actions. On the magic circle view, 
games exist in their own world with independent rules and 
1 Such amoralism has been evaluated by Dunn (2012, pp. 356–362), 
Ostritsch (2017, pp. 117–118), and Young (2013, pp. 6–7; 15–18).
2 ‘Inappropriate engagement’ is explained in more depth in the “Why 
virtual murder can sometimes be wrong” section. In essence, it refers 
to players not engaging with the game in the way that the game crea-
tors intended.
3 Some might object that ‘massively multiplayer’ refers to two fea-
tures rather than one, i.e. there is massiveness alongside a multiplayer 
element. This is technically true, but I will consider both elements 
together as (a) no part of my argument relies on the notion of ‘mas-
siveness’ so there is no dialectal need to give massiveness a sepa-
rate discussion and (b) as massiveness and the multiplayer element 
are connected, considering them separately would likely necessitate 
repetition. For our purposes it is sufficient to state that ‘massiveness’ 
refers to the scale of the multiplayer element of MMORPGs. For 
example, according to a survey by Statista (2015), there were 5.5 mil-
lion players of World of Warcraft in 2015.
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norms, so game actions cannot be evaluated from external 
(real-world) moral vantage points.
To argue against the above, and show that the ‘massively 
multiplayer’ element of MMORPGs is morally evaluable, 
we need to extend Patridge’s claim to explain how game 
actions performed against other players can transcend the 
magic circle. One way of doing this is to argue that, when 
other real people are involved, virtual actions have a neces-
sary and systematic connection with the real world. Regard-
less of how fantastical or fictionalised the action or text of 
the virtual interaction is, the underlying nature of the inter-
action [(typically) real-time communication between per-
sons] is real. For this reason, we can classify MMORPGs 
as what Dunn (2012), drawing on the arguments of Edward 
Castronova, calls ‘open game worlds’. On Dunn’s definition, 
open game worlds are extensions of the real world and, con-
sequently, actions performed within open game worlds mat-
ter, both psychologically and morally (Dunn 2012, p. 256). 
MMORPGs are open game worlds because the presence of 
other real people means that virtual actions, such as virtual 
murder, can go beyond the game world to have a moral and 
psychological impact on real people (the other gamers).4
At this point my opponent might object that Dunn’s ‘open 
game worlds’ does not do enough to avoid the magic circle 
arguments. This is because we have yet to explain how vir-
tual actions have a moral impact on real people (the other 
gamers). One option would be to accept a consequentialist 
view, whereby virtual actions impact real people (the other 
gamers) if they have real-world consequences, such as caus-
ing psychological distress (Dunn 2012; Wolfendale 2009). 
This view, however, does not avoid the magic circle argu-
ments. A defender of the magic circle view could argue that 
all the consequentialist argument shows is that the player 
experiencing psychological distress is playing the game in 
the wrong way; they are overinvested and/or are poor los-
ers.5 This is not enough to show that the game action (virtual 
murder) is wrong.
For the remainder of this article I will argue that vir-
tual murder is wrong when it exploits the player control-
ling the virtual murder victim.6 In the “How virtual murder 
can be exploitative” section, I will argue that virtual mur-
der is exploitative if the victim player has no opportunity 
to consent to the act.7 This will happen when the virtual 
murder is a supposedly forbidden action, is of ambiguous 
permissibility, and/or is purposefully performed on players 
who do not (yet) know the rules of the game.8 In these cases, 
I argue that such virtual murders are wrong both within the 
magic circle (as they typically violate game norms) and out-
side the magic circle (as, because the victim player has no 
opportunity to consent to the act, a real person (the victim 
player) is being treated as a mere means). The remainder of 
this section will explain how the other features of MMOR-
PGS- being online, involving roleplay, and being games—
enable such exploitation, allowing some virtual murders to 
be wrong.9
Online
The online nature of MMORPGs will necessarily affect 
how we understand this moral wronging claim. On the 
one hand, moral wronging seems to be made easier in 
the online world than in the real world. This is at least 
partially due to the anonymity found in online spaces [see 
McCormick (2001) and Danielson (1992)]. For example, 
when I interact with you in a MMORPG, you encounter 
me as a fictionalised avatar; my actual identity remains 
hidden. As McCormick (2001, pp. 282–283) explains, 
this anonymity can sometimes encourage users to act in 
ways that they would not condone in the real world. In 
MMORPG settings, this can range from using insulting, 
4 A similar argument is presented in Driver’s (2007) ‘Dream Immo-
rality’. Driver argues that, for a non-veridical action to be immoral, 
said action must track reality and systematically connect to real-world 
consequences.
5 For a discussion of emotional overinvestment, see Wolfendale 
(2009, pp. 9–10).
6 Existing literature concedes that a virtual action is objectionable 
if it harms or wrongs a real person (Ali 2015; McCormick 2001; 
Ostritsch 2017; Wolf 2003). I contribute a new dimension by focusing 
exclusively on the harms generated by exploitation.
7 Other examples of exploitative acts in MMORPGs include interfer-
ing with other players by freezing their movements, relocating them 
to another place, or otherwise disrupting their game plans for its own 
sake. I will not consider these other forms of exploitation further 
as my focus is on how virtual murder, as an exploitative act, can be 
wrong; not whether virtual acts in general can be exploitative. How-
ever, this being said, it is worth noting that an upshot of my argument 
will be that, if virtual murder can be morally objectionable because 
it is exploitative, then other virtual acts that are exploitative in the 
same way (by being acts that players have no opportunity to consent 
to) will also be morally objectionable. My arguments can therefore be 
extended beyond virtual murder. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
this point.
8 There are virtual murders which do not involve these features and 
are not exploitative. For example, virtual murders that are permitted 
game actions and which are performed on players who know the rules 
of the game. Such non-exploitative virtual murders are not wrong on 
my account. This does not damage my argument as my focus is on 
showing that some virtual murders are wrong when they are exploita-
tive.
9 As it is only the ‘multiplayer’ nature of the game which is neces-
sary for exploitation, we could just as easily focus on morally evalu-
ating exploitation in any multiplayer game. For the purposes of this 
article, I am restricting the scope to examining one type of exploita-
tion (virtual murder) in one type of multiplayer game (MMORPGs). 
This is because MMORPGs seem to be the most salient fora for, and 
virtual murder a strong form of, the kind of exploitative wronging I 
am concerned with. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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discriminatory slurs to simulating immoral actions, such 
as virtual rape.
On the other hand, there is ongoing debate regarding 
how seriously we should take these online wrongs. At 
least in the case of game actions, it seems clear that online 
wrongs are not as wrong as their real-world counterparts. 
In saying that virtual murder is wrong, we are not say-
ing that it has the same moral (or legal) status as real-
world murder. And yet, as the last subsection indicated, 
there does seem to be something wrong with some virtual 
murders.
This difficulty with determining the moral status of 
online actions has been well discussed by Young (2015). 
Young begins by stating that moral judgements “…form 
the basis for rules which have their own objective sta-
tus within the socially constructed space they occupy” 
(p. 318). For example, we know that actual murder is 
wrong because, in the real-world, there is general con-
sensus that murder possesses various wrong-making 
properties. Conversely, Young argues that it is less clear-
cut that virtual murder is wrong because virtual murder 
takes place in a new socially constructed space (the online 
world) whose moral rules are open to debate. Young thus 
seems to claim that, in order to say that virtual murder 
is wrong, we would need to agree what wrong-making 
property virtual murder has, and that the presence of this 
wrong-making property justifies taking a disapproving 
attitude towards virtual murder. If we can get consensus 
on this disapproval, then we can create a moral norm or 
code for virtual murder (pp. 318–319).
In what follows I will argue that virtual murder is 
wrong because it violates a genuine moral requirement. 
I will agree with Immanuel Kant that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with treating a person as a mere 
means, as happens in cases of exploitation where we treat 
a person in a way that they have no opportunity to consent 
to. In other words, I accept that there is a certain code of 
conduct (never treat persons as mere means) that ought 
to be followed; if this code is violated, one has acted 
immorally.
From this I will argue that, when virtual murder does 
violate a moral code in this way, the correct response is 
to morally condemn these virtual murders. In this sense, 
I am adopting the strong response to online wrongness 
promoted by Waddington (2007). Waddington argues 
that, when a virtual game action violates a moral code, 
we must condemn the action because, to fail to do so 
would be “… to devalue…the very idea of wrongness.” 
(Waddington 2007, p. 128). In accepting this view, I am 
suggesting that, whilst virtual murder is not as wrong as 
actual murder, it is nevertheless really wrong in the sense 
of violating a real-world moral code in an online space.
Roleplaying
At this point, some might object that the roleplaying nature 
of MMORPGs prevents the gamer from actually ever vio-
lating a moral code when they perform a virtual murder. 
A specific variant of this objection will be considered in 
“The social roles objection” section. For now, though, we 
can present the objection more generally as follows. Gam-
ers play certain roles in MMORPGs and, on the basis of 
these roles, certain game actions, such as trash-talking, vio-
lence, or perhaps even virtual murder, become permissible 
(at least within the world of the game). This is because the 
game role somehow justifies the performance of otherwise 
immoral acts. For example, suppose that our gamer is play-
ing an apocalyptic fantasy MMORPG. Her avatar is a bounty 
hunter tasked with killing members of a rebel group who are 
committed to the destruction of civilisation. In this case, it 
does not seem like the gamer violates a moral code when 
she virtually murders avatars who belong to members of 
the rebel group. Her role as bounty hunter seems to give a 
morally exempting reason for performing virtual murder.
The above objection thus depends on the idea that, by 
taking on a certain character, the gamer’s actions are miti-
gated by some narrative element of the game’s storyline. 
In this sense, gamers are viewed as analogous to actors; 
both the actor and the gamer are not morally responsible for 
actions performed when in-character [see Ostritsch (2017) 
and McCormick (2001)] and so they never commit a wrong 
(within these roleplay spaces).
This claim—that roleplaying neutralises moral responsi-
bility—has, however, recently been challenged by expressiv-
ist arguments. The basic expressivist claim, here explained 
in terms of Bartel’s (2015) arguments, is that a violent act in 
a video game can sometimes be morally wrong (even if it is 
scripted and determined) if it reflects the will of the player 
(i.e. what they actually desire to do). In these cases of will-
ing participation, an otherwise permissible virtual murder 
becomes wrong because it expresses an immoral attitude on 
the part of the player. To see this, we can consider an exam-
ple presented by Patridge (2013) in which “a game might 
invite us to virtually hunt down and lynch characters that 
appear to be of African descent” (p. 33). Unlike the previ-
ous bounty-hunting example, this lynching example does not 
provide a justifying reason to perform virtual murder. This is 
because, as Patridge explains, there seems to be something 
morally wrong about a gamer willingly adopting the role of 
a lyncher. This is because, in adopting this role, the gamer 
must engage with the game in a way that supports immoral 
viewpoints, i.e. that racism and genocide are ‘fun’ (ibid). In 
these cases, the virtual game action seems to transcend the 
amoral realm of the magic circle because the game action 
itself violates a real-world moral code (promoting racism, 
genocide, etc.)
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The remainder of this article will focus on virtual murders 
which also transcend the magic circle by violating real-world 
moral codes. Using the arguments of Ali (2015) and McCor-
mick (2001) as a touchstone, I will explain how some virtual 
murders in MMORPGs involve, respectively, inappropriate 
engagement and bad sportsmanship. I then develop these 
arguments to argue that such cases do not simply show bad 
gaming practice, they involve a form of exploitation that 
violates real-world moral codes (in this case Kant’s formula 
of humanity).
Games
To argue for the above, I will be accepting that the ‘games’ 
element of MMORPGs is itself morally evaluable. To do 
this, I draw on Ostritsch’s (2017) claim that “games them-
selves can be morally problematic, viz. when they do not 
only represent immoral actions but endorse a morally prob-
lematic viewpoint” (p. 117). In other words, I am claiming 
that MMORPGs are not morally evaluable simply because 
they allow for virtual murder, but because they are the sort 
of game that allows for virtual murder to be performed in 
morally objectionable ways (in this case, as a form of exploi-
tation) [see Goerger (2017) and Ostritsch (2017)].
To reiterate the above arguments, I will claim that some 
virtual murders in MMORPGS are morally evaluable 
because they can wrong other real persons and, in doing 
so, violate real-world moral codes. In the next section I will 
provide the foundations for this argument by considering 
Ali’s (2015) and McCormick’s (2001) moral evaluations of 
virtual murder. The “How virtual murder can be exploita-
tive” section will expand on these arguments to show how 
both can be used to support the claim that virtual murder is 
wrong on Kantian grounds of exploitation.
Why virtual murder can sometimes be 
wrong
In opposition to standard claims that virtual murder is not 
impermissible (see Luck 2009), Ali (2015) and McCormick 
(2001) both accept that virtual murder can, in some cases, 
possess wrong-making features. This section will summarise 
their arguments, before explaining how both arguments can 
be extended in order to account for the particular wrongness 
of virtual murders performed within MMORPGs.
Ali (2015): inappropriate engagement
Rami Ali’s argument begins with the claim that to under-
stand the moral significance of virtual game actions, we 
need to look at how players are engaging with the game 
(p. 269). As an expressivist, Ali suggests that we assess 
engagement by observing whether gamers are willingly 
acting out immoral game narratives (p. 272) or are using 
the game to roleplay immoral fantasies (pp. 269, 274). 
Ali argues that both of these are cases of inappropriate 
engagement, but for our purposes it is the latter exam-
ple—using the game to roleplay immoral fantasies—that 
is particularly interesting as it focuses on ways in which 
players can use a game in morally objectionable ways.
Ali focuses on cases where “…gamers use the game 
and the available actions for their own ends, not for the 
ends that are specified by the game” (p. 271). He gives the 
example of a gamer playing a sports game in order to enjoy 
the scenery; in this case the gamer is not playing the game 
in the correct way. As Ali highlights, this issue of using 
the game in the wrong way is particularly problematic in 
games which lack a defined narrative, and which make 
deviance from the proper game aim even easier (p. 273). 
For example, Call of Duty allows for the game narrative 
to change based on the player’s choices. On Ali’s defini-
tion, a gamer would show inappropriate engagement if 
they were to use modded content in order to alter the pos-
sible narratives so as to give their character a particular 
advantage, or to perform unscripted immoral acts. As Ali 
explains, these modified/deviant game actions cannot be 
morally permissible “…if their only pretext is enjoying the 
freedom and performance of these acts” (p. 273). We can 
apply this to our virtual murder case as follows. A virtual 
murder may be permissible if it is performed as part of a 
non-objectionable game narrative. However, on the inap-
propriate engagement view, a virtual murder can become 
impermissible if the gamer uses the game to perform a 
virtual murder that (a) goes against the game narrative 
and (b) is performed because the gamer wants to perform 
the act.
Ali’s argument can, therefore, be summarised as the 
claim that some virtual murders are wrong because the 
gamer is performing virtual murder in the wrong way. 
Namely, the gamer is choosing to perform a virtual murder 
and, in doing so, are using the game in a non-standard way. 
Ali’s argument is thus limited to chastising the gamer per-
forming the virtual murder because their desire to perform 
virtual murder reflects an immoral, non-innocent fantasy. 
This is an important point to make, but I argue that Ali’s 
claims can be extended further. In the “How virtual mur-
der can be exploitative” section I will explain how inap-
propriate engagement in MMORPGs typically involves 
the exploitation of other players. In this sense, virtual 
murder is wrong not only because the gamer performing 
the virtual murder has chosen to perform the murder, but 
because, in making this choice, the gamer controlling the 
virtual murderer necessarily exploits the gamer controlling 
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the virtual victim by acting in a modified/deviant way that 
they have no opportunity to consent to.
McCormick (2001): bad sportsmanship
Like Ali, McCormick accepts that we can determine the 
moral status of virtual game actions by examining how 
players (in our case, the player controlling the murderer) 
engage with the game. Where McCormick differs to Ali is 
in his use of a Kantian framework to assess game engage-
ment (pp. 282–285). Specifically, McCormick focuses on 
Kant’s formula of humanity: “So act that you use humanity, 
in your own person as well as in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” 
(Kant 2012 [1785], IV: 429, 10–12). McCormick correctly 
explains that, on Kant’s view, to treat persons morally, we 
must recognise their status as autonomous, rational agents 
(or ends, in Kantian terminology). If we fail to grant this 
recognition, we treat a person as a mere means (McCormick, 
p. 282). Using this definition, McCormick argues that one 
way to treat a person as a mere means is to act violently 
towards them. This is because when we perform violent acts, 
we objectify the victim as something to be used (ibid). He 
then considers whether this argument can be transferred to 
the virtual world—do violent game actions (such as virtual 
murder) in MMORPGs cause persons to be treated as mere 
means?
In response to this question, McCormick argues that vio-
lent game actions in MMORPGs do treat persons as mere 
means when they involve bad sportsmanship. In competi-
tive games, the winner will be a bad sport if they are disre-
spectful or insulting to the loser, whereas the loser will be 
a bad sport if they demean the achievements of the winner 
(p. 282). McCormick argues that what is wrong in both of 
these cases of bad sportsmanship is that the player is overly 
concerned with their own experiences (winning/losing) 
and fails to acknowledge the autonomous goals of the other 
player (p. 282).
McCormick’s argument thus presents one way in which 
we can assess virtual murder in MMOPRGs using a Kan-
tian framework. On McCormick’s view, if a virtual murder 
shows bad sportsmanship then it will violate the formula 
of humanity by treating a person as a mere means. Interest-
ingly, whilst McCormick does accept that virtual actions 
can be assessed in this way, the remainder of his argument is 
concerned with showing why virtual actions which show bad 
sportsmanship are not, in fact, wrong on Kantian grounds. 
He offers two arguments for this view.
Firstly, McCormick argues that bad sportsmanship is not 
a notable moral wrong. He claims that “…while being a 
bad sport is not a very serious moral crime for Kant (it is 
not murder, after all), he would say that one should strive to 
be a good sport” (p. 282). In this sense, McCormick seems 
to shift from talking about bad sportsmanship in terms of 
morality (one ought not be a bad sport) to talking about it 
in terms of appropriate behaviour (if one wants to play the 
game properly, one ought to develop the right character). In 
other words, McCormick is saying that bad sportsmanship 
is undesirable rather than wrong. McCormick justifies this 
argument by stressing that bad sportsmanship is possible 
in all competitive games, such as football, boxing, domi-
noes etc (pp. 282–283). As, on McCormick’s view, there is 
nothing special about the bad sportsmanship shown in video 
games, he argues that all cases of bad sportsmanship would 
have to be treated equally. If an action in a video game is 
wrong because it shows bad sportsmanship, we would have 
to also say that actions in dominoes or rugby are wrong 
because they show bad sportsmanship. As McCormick 
argues, this would condemn far too many games as being 
morally wrong. For this reason, he concludes that good 
sportsmanship can only be a recommendation rather than a 
moral requirement (p. 283).
Secondly, McCormick argues that the only type of moral 
duty that is violated in virtual gaming cases are indirect 
moral duties, and the violation of these indirect duties is 
insufficient to show that an action is wrong (p. 283–284). 
McCormick defines indirect duties as the duties we have to 
not perform certain actions, not because they are wrong per 
se, but because performing these actions increases the likeli-
hood that we will violate our direct duties to others (ibid). 
To explain this further, McCormick suggests an analogy 
between our treatment of animals and our treatment of vir-
tual avatars (p. 283). He explains that, on Kantian grounds, 
we have an indirect duty to not harm animals because there is 
a risk that, by harming animals, we will become indifferent 
to pain and suffering and will consequently be more likely 
to mistreat other humans. By parity of reasoning, McCor-
mick suggests that we have an indirect duty to not perform 
violent game actions because, by performing these actions, 
we become indifferent and may consequently be more likely 
to be violent to others in the real world.10 McCormick then 
states that violating such indirect duties (for example, by 
performing a violent game action) is insufficient to show 
that that action is wrong, on Kantian grounds (p. 284). To 
justify this claim, McCormick focuses on Kant’s statement 
that certain actions, such as butchery and surgery, violate 
indirect duties to not harm but are nevertheless not wrong. 
This is because these activities benefit society in a way that 
outweighs their negative side effect: that the butcher and 
surgeon might become indifferent to pain and mistreat others 
10 McCormick’s argument has some similarities to Ali’s inappropri-
ate engagement view. Both argue that a violent game action can be 
wrong when, in performing the action, the gamer displays an inappro-
priate or immoral attitude (e.g. that murder is fun).
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(ibid). McCormick argues that the same can be said about 
virtual game actions: their benefits (enjoyment) seem to out-
weigh their potential negative side effects (generating indif-
ference). In this sense, whilst virtual murder does violate 
indirect moral duties, it is not wrong on Kantian grounds.11
In the “How virtual murder can be exploitative” section 
I will argue that McCormick is incorrect to suppose that 
virtual murder in MMORPGs cannot be wrong on Kantian 
grounds. Contrary to McCormick’s claims I will explain how 
there is a difference between the bad sportsmanship shown 
in MMORPGs and the bad sportsmanship shown in other 
competitive games. The former but not the latter involves a 
type of immoral exploitation. By focusing on exploitation, I 
will argue that what is wrong with virtual murder is not that 
it increases the risk that we will mistreat others in the future, 
but that it mistreats the player controlling the victim now. By 
exploiting the player controlling the victim, we treat them 
in a way that they have no opportunity to consent to. As 
this exploitative treatment violates the formula of humanity, 
virtual murder can be wrong on Kantian grounds.
How virtual murder can be exploitative
The last section suggested that we can expand the arguments 
of both Ali (2015) and McCormick (2001) by bringing in 
the concept of exploitation. On my view, a virtual murder 
will be wrong (on Kantian grounds) if it violates the formula 
of humanity by treating the player controlling the victim 
as a mere means. This will happen in cases of exploitation 
where the player controlling the victim has no opportunity 
to consent to the virtual murder. In this respect, my thesis 
agrees with Ali and McCormick that some virtual murders 
are objectionable, but brings in elements that their accounts 
miss. I emphasise the wronged party to a greater extent (the 
player controlling the virtual murder victim), and identify 
the kind of wrong done to them (virtual murder exploits 
them by treating them in a way that they have no opportunity 
to consent to). Below, I will present some cases of virtual 
murder which are exploitative because the player control-
ling the victim has no opportunity to tacitly consent to the 
virtual murder. I will explain how some cases of inappropri-
ate engagement (Ali) and bad sportsmanship (McCormick) 
are good examples of these exploitative virtual murders.12
As Pallikkathayil (2010) explains, tacit consent occurs 
when “…just by acting in a certain way, one changes the 
permissions others have whether or not one wants those per-
missions to change and would refuse to endorse the change 
if asked” (p. 127). For example, strangers are not (typically) 
permitted to observe me by staring through the windows of 
my (private) house. However, when I leave my house and 
enter a public space, strangers are permitted to observe me, 
even if I would not agree to being observed. In other words, I 
have made a choice (to leave my house) and in choosing this 
action I tacitly consent to others behaving in certain ways 
towards me, even though I would not explicitly consent to 
their actions if asked.
As Wolf (2003, p. 1) implies, tacit consent seems particu-
larly relevant to virtual murder. This is because engaging 
with a virtual game is an entirely optional act, so all gamers 
choose to play a certain game and/or to continue playing a 
certain game. As MMORPGs are multiplayer environments, 
when a gamer chooses to play a MMORPG they voluntarily 
place themselves in a situation which allows others to inter-
act with them (ibid). Using our definition of tacit consent, 
we could make the following claim: victims make a choice 
(to play a MMORPG) and in choosing this action they tacitly 
consent to others behaving in certain ways towards them, 
even though they would not agree to their actions, if asked. 
In this way, victims may tacitly consent to virtual murder.
Intuitively, the above does seem to provide a strong 
argument against the impermissibility of virtual murder: by 
choosing to play a violent MMORPG at all, victims must 
necessarily consent to all violent acts, including their own 
virtual murder. However, I argue that the tacit consent view 
is actually not strong enough to demonstrate the permis-
sibility of virtual murder. This is because, for tacit consent 
to make virtual murder permissible, the tacit consent must 
involve a level of awareness of background norms and moral 
standards. As I will argue below, there are cases of virtual 
11 This line of argument has been challenged by David I. Waddington 
(2007, p.  125). Waddington explains that the reason Kant condones 
the actions of butchers and surgeons, in spite of them violating indi-
rect duties to not harm, is because they are needed in society. The 
harm that they perform is a necessarily evil. Waddington points out 
that virtual game actions do not have this same status. They are not 
necessary evils. The gamer performs a violent/harmful action because 
they choose to; gamers do not have to play video games, and video 
games do not have to feature violent actions. As such, Waddington 
argues that McCormick’s arguments on the justifiability of indirect 
harms does not extend to virtual game actions.
12 Note that there may be cases of wrongful murder in MMORPGs 
which are neither bad sportsmanship nor inappropriate engagement. 
This would not undermine my argument. I am concerned with show-
ing how virtual murders in MMORPGs can be exploitative when the 
victim player has no opportunity to consent to the act. Below I will 
explain how this is shown in many cases of inappropriate engage-
ment and bad sportsmanship, and other cases where tacit consent is 
missing. I am referencing cases of inappropriate engagement and bad 
sportsmanship as they seem to be good examples of the exploitative 
treatment that I am interested in.
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murder where this awareness is missing, and where it is not 
possible for tacit consent to be suitably informed.13 Because 
of this, the virtual murder will be exploitative in such cases.
Above I suggested that, to tacitly consent to virtual mur-
der, victims must have an awareness of how their action 
(playing the game) relates to relevant norms and moral 
standards (the permissibility of virtual murder). In what 
follows I will argue that there are three main ways in which 
this awareness can be lacking from virtual murder cases.
The first way in which victims could fail to tacitly consent 
to virtual murder is if virtual murder is supposedly a forbid-
den action, according to the rules of the game. There are two 
main ways in which we can present this idea. Firstly, suppose 
we take a game in which there is a blanket rule preventing 
all virtual murder. In such games, if a virtual murder is per-
formed, it is an illegitimate action. As the virtual murder 
would not be an intended game action, this would be an 
example of both Ali’s inappropriate engagement, and an act 
where the victim player has no opportunity to give tacit con-
sent. Secondly, we might suppose that, whilst other acts of 
virtual killing and combat are permissible, certain types of 
virtual murder are implicitly forbidden. An example of this 
would be the so-called team killing murders performed in 
games such as Playerunknown’s Battlegrounds. In team kill-
ing scenarios, victims are invited to join an existing group 
of players to complete a quest. Once the quest is complete, 
and victims have fulfilled their purpose, victims are mur-
dered by members of their own team (Chalk 2017). In cases 
where virtual murder is supposedly forbidden, it is clear that 
victims cannot tacitly consent to the virtual murder. This 
is because it is reasonable for victims to assume that their 
action (playing the game) relates to the background norm 
that virtual murder is impermissible.
The second way in which victims could fail to tacitly 
consent to virtual murder is if the moral standard related 
to virtual murder is ambiguous. Again, there are two ways 
in which this could happen. Firstly, the game may lack an 
explicit code of conduct and/or fail to offer any explicit con-
sideration of the act of virtual murder. This may happen 
in cases where the act of virtual murder is not an original 
game action, but one that has been developed as a result of 
a hack or modification. Many of these ‘modification’ cases 
would be an example of Ali’s inappropriate engagement. 
Secondly, it may be that, whilst virtual murder is permis-
sible, it is not clear whether it is permissible in all game 
contexts. An example of this type of ambiguity is discussed 
by Mason (2014, pp. 1115–1117) in relation to a 2006 World 
of Warcraft case in which a gamer died and her virtual guild 
held an in-game funeral for her avatar. During the funeral a 
rival guild appeared and massacred all those attending. As 
Mason explains, there is some debate as to whether a virtual 
murder performed in a non-combat funeral setting is per-
missible. As long as this ambiguity is present, it is typically 
not the case that victims tacitly consent to virtual murder. 
This is because, as background moral standards are open to 
interpretation, it is unclear how the victim’s actions (playing 
the game) link to these interpretable standards. Tacit consent 
can, again, not be fully informed.
Finally, victims could fail to tacitly consent to virtual 
murder if they are not aware of the norms and moral stand-
ards of the game. In other words, the victim does not know 
that virtual murder is a possible action. As Simon Carne 
explains, this is typically shown in so-called “…Newbie-kill-
ing [purposefully killing new players who have not learned 
how to play the game]…” (Carne in Wolf 2003, p. 70). In 
these cases, whilst the virtual murder may be a permissible 
action, it is still not feasible to suppose that victims tac-
itly consent to the virtual murder. This is because, by not 
knowing what game actions are possible and/or permissi-
ble, the victim cannot know how their action (playing the 
game) links to (currently unknown) norms and moral stand-
ards.14 This third type of virtual murder may be an example 
of McCormick’s bad sportsmanship. This is because the 
player controlling the murderer is purposefully exploiting 
the player controlling the victim’s lack of knowledge, and is 
acting in a way that ignores the victim player’s autonomous 
goals.
What the above suggests is that, for victims to tacitly 
consent to virtual murder in a way that would make the act 
permissible, they must have a full and definitive understand-
ing of how and when virtual murder is permissible. If cor-
rect, the above discussion presents three ways in which this 
tacit consent could be missing in virtual murder cases. Some 
virtual murders can be wrong because they are forbidden, of 
ambiguous permissibility, or an opportunistic exploitation 
of victims’ lack of knowledge. As argued above, many of 
these morally wrong virtual murders will also be examples 
of inappropriate engagement (Ali) and/or bad sportsmanship 
(McCormick).
13 I am not saying that it is impossible for a player to give informed 
consent to virtual murder in general. I am saying that, in the cases 
described below, it is incoherent to suppose that the victim player 
gives informed consent. This is because, in such cases, the actions of 
the murderer player prevent the victim player from having the oppor-
tunity to consent to the act of virtual murder.
14 I take it that a player will know that virtual murder is a possi-
ble action if they know that virtual murder could happen within the 
game. To know this, I do not think that a player would need to know 
all possible virtual actions within the game (i.e. every conceivable 
move or action that another player could perform against them). As 
footnote 16 explains, this would be an overly demanding requirement 
and related more to explicit consent than tacit consent. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.
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In the examples discussed, because victims do not have 
a clear understanding of the moral standards regarding the 
permissibility of virtual murder, victims cannot tacitly con-
sent to virtual murder. Due to this absence of tacit consent, 
the virtual murders discussed above exploit the player con-
trolling the victim by treating them in a way that they have 
no opportunity to consent to (in other words, it treats them as 
mere means). As this exploitative treatment violates Kant’s 
aforementioned formula of humanity, these virtual murders 
are wrong on Kantian grounds. The next section will defend 
this view against the social roles objection.15
The social roles objection
The social roles objection challenges the idea that, in cases 
of potential exploitation, victims have not consented to the 
‘exploitative’ act. It does this by arguing that, in most cases 
of apparent exploitation, victims have agreed to play a social 
role. In accepting this social role, victims have tacitly con-
sented to otherwise impermissible treatment that results 
from their social role (see Young 2013, pp. 40–41; Parfit 
2011, pp. 212–232). As victims have given tacit consent, 
the act does not treat them as mere means; they are treated 
simultaneously as a means and an end.
In this sense, the social roles objection implicitly chal-
lenges my definition of tacit consent. I argued that a victim 
will tacitly consent to virtual murder if, and only if, they are 
aware of how their action (playing the game) relates to back-
ground norms and moral standards concerning the permis-
sibility of virtual murder. The social roles objection can be 
used to challenge this definition by claiming that the relevant 
action is not simply playing the game, but playing the game 
whilst playing a specific social role (to be defined below) 
which exempts certain treatment from being exploitative.
Indeed, the social roles objection works particularly well 
when applied to games and competitive sport. For example, 
consider the exploitative act of my punching you in the face 
in order to reduce my stress levels. As this act is neither 
legitimate nor anticipatable you, as the victim, cannot tacitly 
consent to my punching you in the face. My action treats you 
as a mere means and is exploitative and wrong, according to 
Kant. However, suppose that you are playing the social role 
of a boxer and we are in the context of a boxing ring. In this 
case, the otherwise exploitative act (punching you in the face 
to reduce my stress levels) becomes morally acceptable. This 
is because, by agreeing to play the social role of a boxer, you 
have tacitly consented to being physically attacked within 
the context of the boxing ring. As you have agreed to this 
treatment, my punching you in the face is legitimate and 
anticipatable and is therefore not exploitative.16
My opponents could apply a similar argument to virtual 
murder. By playing the game, victims are agreeing to play 
the role of a game opponent.17 By playing the social role of 
a game opponent, victims tacitly consent to any activities 
that result from playing this social role. In notably com-
bative games (such as World of Warcraft) where the risk of 
virtual death is high, agreeing to play the social role of a 
game opponent entails that victims have tacitly consented 
to violent treatment by other players. In these cases, virtual 
murder becomes a legitimate and anticipatable act and is no 
longer exploitative (as I claim).18
For the above argument to work, victims must be aware of 
the risk of virtual murder (it must be anticipatable), under-
stand that virtual murder is possible (it must be legitimate), 
and have chosen to continue playing the role of a game oppo-
nent. It is only if this can be shown that the social roles 
objection can refute my claim that virtual murder is exploita-
tive. In what follows I argue that the social roles objection is 
unsuccessful as it relies on a problematic claim that victims 
agree to play the social role of game opponents.
To understand why this claim is problematic, let us 
unpick what would be required for victims to agree to play 
the social role of game opponents. To agree to play this 
role, victims must (a) know what social role they are playing 
15 As discussed above, Kant’s formula of humanity argues that it is 
impermissible to treat a person as a mere means. This initially seems 
to prohibit a number of everyday actions, namely those that involve 
us using a person in order to get something, e.g., using a salesper-
son to get food. The social roles objection is motivated by a desire 
to explain the intuitive belief that these ‘exploitative’ actions are not 
actually wrong. It does this by explaining why the ‘exploited’ agent 
(the salesperson) is not treated as a mere means and, consequently, 
why the actions that we perform against these agents are actually per-
missible on Kantian grounds. The objection considered below thus 
helps to clarify the scope of permissible and impermissible actions, 
according to Kant’s formula of humanity.
16 Some may retort that boxers actually give explicit consent rather 
than tacit consent. I argue that, whilst boxers do give explicit con-
sent to take part in matches, they only give tacit consent to their 
opponent’s strategies and actions. This is because a boxer could only 
explicitly consent to their opponent’s actions if they knew every spe-
cific action and/or move that their opponent was going to perform. 
This demands too much.In arguing that boxers give tacit consent (and 
are thus not exploited), I am highlighting a difference between com-
petitive sports and MMORPGs (in which, actions can lack tacit con-
sent). This challenges McCormick’s aforementioned claim that there 
is no distinction between the two types of game.
17 This is a variant of the arguments considered in the “Roleplaying” 
subsection of “The moral status of MMORPGs” subsection.
18 Importantly, the social roles argument challenges my previ-
ous argument that victims cannot tacitly consent to virtual murder 
because they lack knowledge of relevant norms and moral standards. 
According to the social roles argument, the victim is aware of these 
norms and standards as, by agreeing to play the social role of a game 




(game opponents), (b) have a clear understanding of the 
relationship between themselves and those using them as a 
means, and (c) have all the information needed to make an 
informed, autonomous decision regarding whether they wish 
to continue being used as a means in this context.
Conditions b and c cannot be met in the virtual murder 
examples mentioned in the last section. Player Two (the 
victim) cannot fully understand the relationship between 
themselves and those using them as a means (player one) 
because, in the cases considered, when player one performs 
virtual murder, they are performing an opportunistic or devi-
ant act which uses player two in new and unexpected ways. 
Thus, whilst player two could understand that they are a 
game opponent to player one, they cannot be expected to 
understand that they are a potential victim for player one. 
Similarly, in the cases of virtual murder considered, player 
two does not have all the information needed to make an 
informed, autonomous decision regarding whether they wish 
to continue being used as a means in this context. This is 
because the context (virtual murder) is itself deviant and 
opportunistic so there is no background knowledge or norms 
that player two can draw on in order to make an autonomous 
decision about whether to continue playing with the risk of 
virtual murder.
If the above is correct, then player two (the victim) does 
not meet the conditions for playing the social role of a game 
opponent. If so, then the social roles objection fails to show 
that victims play the role of game opponents and, in doing 
so, offer informed, tacit consent to virtual murder.
Conclusion
This article has expanded the arguments of Ali (2015) and 
McCormick (2001) by arguing that a virtual murder in a 
MMORPG can be wrong (on Kantian grounds) if it exploits 
the player controlling the victim. To do this, I argued that 
there are virtual murders that are exploitative because the 
player controlling the victim does not have the opportunity 
to tacitly consent to the virtual murder, and I presented case 
studies which showed this. Because of this lack of tacit 
consent, these virtual murders violate Kant’s formula of 
humanity, and are wrong on Kantian grounds. I concluded 
by defending this view against the social roles objection. In 
rejecting the social roles objection, I argued that victims do 
not tacitly consent to virtual murder as a result of playing 
the social role of game opponents.
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